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PLURALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONFLICT WITHIN:
CHALLENGING THE STATE’S NARRATIVE BY ARTISTIC FORMS OF
PROTEST
by Alexandra V. Orlova*

Abstract
This article follows the Pussy Riot case from the 2012 trial
decision to the 2018 challenge before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR). The case revolved around the “punk
prayer” performed by three women in Christ the Saviour
Cathedral in Moscow. While the case, which centered on violation
of freedom of expression, may be framed as a matter of political
speech vs. religious speech, it has broader implications. Pussy
Riot’s performance and subsequent legal cases were about the
ability of pluralism and dissent to counter the carefully
constructed government narrative of “traditional values” and
moral sovereignty. For democracy to develop and endure,
pluralism must continually challenge existing power
relationships and expose inequality. Thus, accountability is key
when it comes to pluralism in the public realm. However, constant
accountability is unimaginable without freedom of expression and
the voicing of dissenting opinions. Thus, in order to live up to its
constitutional commitment to pluralism, it is key for Russia to
develop a safe space for public discussion pertaining to
government, governmental representatives and broader public
policy issues, despite the conflicts that such discussion will
generate. Artistic forms of protest alone, such as the one engaged
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INTRODUCTION
The term “democracy” is often used by various Russian
officials, making it “a regular constituent of the government’s selfrepresentation.”1 However, since the early 2000s the Putin regime
has insisted that democracy has to be “managed.”2 Such
“management” has caused the suppression of information,
dissenting opinions, and political representation in state
institutions. Thus, “[c]reative forms of dissent, such as street theatre
and performance art, joined the arsenal of protest weapons.”3 This
article examines the Pussy Riot case from the 2012 trial decision to
the 2018 challenge before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). The case revolved around the “punk prayer” performed
by three women in Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow. While
the women asserted that their performance was a political act,
Russian courts defined it as criminal hooliganism motivated by
religious hatred under s.213 of the Russian Criminal Code. Pussy
Riot’s members were convicted, and each sentenced to two years of
imprisonment.
While the Pussy Riot case, centering on violation of freedom of
expression, may be framed as a matter of political speech vs.
religious speech, its implications are much broader. Ultimately, the
1

Anastasia Denisova, Democracy, Protest and Public Sphere in Russia After the 20112012 Anti-Government Protests: Digital Media at Stake, 39 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC.,
977 (2016).
2
Id.
3

Id. at 979.
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Pussy Riot performance and subsequent legal cases were about the
ability of pluralism and dissent to counter the carefully constructed
government narrative of “traditional values” and moral
sovereignty. Accountability is key when it comes to pluralism in
the public realm. However, constant accountability is
unimaginable without freedom of expression and the voicing of
dissenting opinions. Thus, in order to live up to its constitutional
commitment to pluralism, it is key for Russia to develop a safe
space for public discussion pertaining to government, government
representatives, and broader public policy issues, despite the
conflicts that this discussion will inevitably generate. Artistic forms
of protest alone, such as the one engaged in by Pussy Riot, are not
enough, as they currently fail to appeal and be accessible to larger
Russian audiences.4
Part I of this article examines why freedom of expression in
general and political speech in particular are vital for democracy
and considers the justifications for regulating hate speech. Part II
looks at the idea of pluralism as vital for democracy, while also
noting that due to the antagonistic nature of pluralism and the
temporary nature of any type of consensus derived from public
deliberations and multiple forms of expression, pluralist
democracy by its nature is both dynamic and fragile. This part
examines why, despite the seeming recognition of the importance
of pluralism for democracy, the concepts of democracy and
pluralism are increasingly being challenged in many places around
the world. It illustrates how the Russian state, in addition to
banishing pluralism from the political sphere, also engaged in a
concerted effort of connecting human rights with morality, thus
making rights unavailable to “sinners.” Part III of the article
examines the challenges to pluralism posed by political and
religious speech. It examines the 2012 Russian trial decision against
the members of Pussy Riot, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence concerning
political speech and religious speech and the ECtHR’s 2018 decision
in the Pussy Riot case. The article concludes that pluralism and the
conflict that it brings are considered threatening by nation states, as
they put ideas into the public realm that compete with the official
narrative. The Russian state’s current view is that pluralism is
something that needs to be managed within a democracy, and that
democracy needs to be based on satisfying the interests of the
4

See id. at 979.
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majority and protecting Russian sovereignty from harmful foreign
influences. Ultimately, what nations and institutions often fail to
acknowledge is that the forces that assail pluralistic democracy are
not foreign, but rather “internal to many, if not most, democratic
nations . . . they are our own ideas and voices.”5 Therefore, the
conflict is not so much an external one, between a foreign and a
domestic view of human rights and dissent, but rather an internal
one, “between people who are prepared to live with others who are
different, on terms of equal respect, and those who seek the
protection of homogeneity.”6

PROTECTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN A DEMOCRACY
In authoritarian regimes, a key concern raised by both domestic
and international critics often revolves around suppression of or
placement of excessive limits on freedom of expression. Freedom
of expression is vital in ensuring the proper functioning of
democracy, and “[i]n Western democratic theory, it is often
considered to be the fundamental freedom upon which all other
rights depend.”7 Processes of contestation and communication are
believed to be indispensable to the development, reshaping and
advancement of other norms and rights.8 In a democracy, it is
crucial for all people to be able to participate in debating issues of
public importance,9 and a properly functioning democracy is often
measured by its tolerance of unpopular or provocative views.10 The
role of constitutional courts is to ensure that “majoritarian
lawgiving” aligns with “the foundational values that underlie the
democratic order.”11 Thus, constitutional courts can limit rights in
a democratic society when such limitations are justified. In other
5

Martha Nussbaum, The Clash Within: Democracy and the Hindu Right, 9 J. HUM.
DEV. 357, 374 (2008).

6

Id. at 359.

7

Keith Dubick, The Theoretical Foundation for Protecting Freedom of Expression, 13
NAT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 2 (1993).
8
Frank A. Morrow, Speech, Expression, and the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235, 235
(1975).
9
Dubick, supra note 7, at 13.
10
11

Id. at 14.

Jacob Weinrib, What Is the Purpose of Freedom of Expression? 67 U. TORONTO FAC.
L. REV. 165, 173 (2009).
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words, constitutional courts ensure that politics based on a
majoritarian conception of democracy do not operate in dissonance
with the democratic values that are “intrinsic to the constitutional
order.”12 Given this purported fundamental connection between
free speech, democracy and other fundamental rights, it is
unsurprising that constitutional courts tend to grant the highest
degree of protection to so-called political speech and regulate it
only when the “strongest showing of harm” is displayed.13
Engagement in political speech allows people to criticize existing
legal arrangements and propose new ones. Without this ability to
contribute to political speech, individuals would become mere
“passive citizens” with no ability to influence their elected
representatives.14 However, despite the emphasis on political
speech doing “the work of democracy,” attempts to come up with
a precise definition of what exactly constitutes political speech
inevitably leads to disputes over whether the “excluded
communication could be interpreted by someone else as
‘political.’”15 Apart from conceptualizing speech pertaining to
political matters as fundamentally different from speech dealing
with purely personal or individual matters,16 the difficulties of
definition stem from ideological considerations and thus persist.17
In part, this preferencing of political over other forms of speech
stems from identifying various key goals that freedom of
expression is thought to promote in a democracy—promotion of
self-government,
preserving
social
stability,
building
accountability and increasing public confidence in the political
system.18 If people are able to meaningfully participate in the
12

Id. at 177.
Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of a
Free Speech Principle, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 343, 358 (2010) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein,
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 123 (New York: The Free Press, 1993)); See
id. at 347 (Political speech includes not only certain types of speech but can also
include non-verbal communication and actions).

13

14

Weinrib, supra note 11, at 180.
Katharine Gelber, Freedom of Political Speech, Hate Speech and the Argument from
Democracy: The Transformative Contribution of Capabilities Theory, 9 CONTEMP. POL.
THEORY 304, 305, 307 (2010).
16
Morrow, supra note 8, at 238.
17
Gelber, supra note 15, at 308.
15

18

Dubick, supra note 7, at 15.
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political process and provide their input through the voicing of
opinions, including dissenting ones, self-government is
facilitated.19 Participation in the political process through various
acts of speech should also drive people to accept political decisions
that they do not necessarily agree with, thus preserving social
stability.20 Moreover, close public scrutiny of elected officials and
governmental policies promotes accountability of public officials to
their constituencies.21 Overall, “[p]olitical legitimacy is more likely
to be achieved in a society that tolerates divergent views from all of
its members, and is responsive to them.”22 In other words, public
discourse and debate legitimize governmental decision-making by
shining a light on governmental decision-making processes23 and
thus ensure the viability of the entire political system.24
Given the supposed connection between free speech and the
very processes of democratic legitimation, regulating hate speech
makes sense, despite this speech often falling within the highly
protected category of “political speech.” Hate speech is restricted
in democratic societies because it:
“impairs the ability of its targets to participate in the
very processes of democratic legitimation that
justify the protection of freedom of speech in the first
place and which are required to enact democracy
itself. [Hate speech] . . . produces inequalities in
speech opportunities and tacitly supports the
ongoing marginalization of some people from
political opportunities.25
Nussbaum has pointed out that the state, under certain
circumstances, has a duty to act to ensure that individuals are able
to achieve their individual capabilities and that a simple absence of

19
20

Morrow, supra note 8, at 241.
Dubick, supra note 7, at 16.

21

Gelber, supra note 15, at 305.

22

Dubick, supra note 7, at 17.

23

Gelber, supra note 15, at 311.
Morrow, supra note 8, at 239.

24
25

Gelber, supra note 15, at 314.
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“negative state action” is simply not enough.26 Hence, the
extremely harmful nature of hate speech justifies its regulation in a
democratic society, even when it also constitutes political speech.27
However, regulating political hate speech is made complicated if
the speakers are able “to couch their claims in language that seems
acceptable, even though they may cause more harm with their
words.”28 Thus, while more obvious and blatant instances of hate
speech are commonly captured within regulatory frameworks,
damaging hate rhetoric presented as “political” or “public policy”
discourse can escape regulation despite arguably causing more
damage.29 There exists a “general reluctance to legally regulate
speech that may be harmful but is not expressed in an extreme
way.”30 Thus, hateful views couched in civil language may be
misidentified as political or academic debate and could not only
offend the targeted group, but gain legitimacy and thus create a
permanent barrier for such a group, perpetuating the group’s often
already marginalized status.31

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PLURALISM
Aside from the debates over what amounts to hate speech, how
it is regulated and whether the preferencing of political speech is
justifiable,32 the idea that in a democratic state political decisions
should be reached through “a process of deliberation among free
and equal citizens” remains a key rationale for protecting pluralism
that may be achieved only through freedom of speech.33 The
pluralistic political system aims to include as many divergent
interests as possible without compromising the ability of the state
26

Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice,
9 FEMINIST ECONOMICS, NO. 2-3, 2003, at 39.

27

Gelber, supra note 15, at 321.

28

Sarah Sorial, Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Problem of (Manufactured) Authority,
29 CANADIAN J. L. AND SOC’Y 59, 60 (2014).

29

Id. at 65 (quoting Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.R.
467, ¶ 116 (Can.)).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 69.
32
33

See Weinrib, supra note 11, at 177.

Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agnostic Pluralism 1 (Institute for
Advanced Studies, Vienna, Political Science Series Working Paper No. 72, 2000).
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to attend to key projects.34 After all, self-government, social
stability and accountability of public officials all depend on the
plurality of views being expressed within the public realm. Thus,
instead of trying to force upon everyone a certain “illusory
consensus on the common good,” social stability and political
participation are better assured through accounting for dissent and
making compromises between divergent interests.35 Pluralism then
is essential for democracy,36 as it grounds both authority and
legitimacy in public reasoning.37 However, pluralism, so seemingly
necessary in a democracy, also entails antagonism. Thus, a
democracy that respects a plurality of values through a proper
accounting of dissent “requires developing an approach, which
places the question of power and antagonism at its very center.”38
Pluralism entails not only recognition of power struggles, injustices
and conflicts, but also their legitimation, rather than suppression
by the imposition of an authoritarian order.39 In a pluralistic
democracy:
the constitutional state can neither display
ambivalence about whether the injustices that it
committed in the past actually occurred, nor can it
idealize present conditions that fail to conform to
constitutional norms. Ambivalence or idealization
about past or present injustices would be
inconsistent with the dignity of persons, who cannot
be assured that past injustices will not recur and that
present ones will be addressed if the state does not
acknowledge its failings and hold itself, both in the

34

William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1293 (2005).
35
Mouffe, supra note 33, at 2.
36
I.V. Nemkevich, “Konstitutsionnoe Zakreplenie Ideologicheskogo Pluralizma
na Postsovetskom Prostranstve,” Vestnik Nizhegorodskogo Universiteta im. N.I.
Lobachevskogo [Constitutional Consolidation of Ideological Pluralism in the PostSoviet Space] (2012) 1:1 at 272 (Russ.).
37
Mouffe, supra note 33, at 4.
38
Id. at 13.
39

Id. at 16.
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present and in the future, to a standard of conduct
that harmonizes with its fundamental norms.40
Thus pluralism, by its nature, is contentious, as it entails
“politics as a process of contention among groups in society, while
at the same time more explicit unmasking and questioning [of] the
power dynamics behind pluralist group differentiation in the first
place.”41 Hence, in a pluralistic democracy any sort of consensus
becomes a “conflictual consensus,” which by its very nature is
temporary. The democratic process becomes “precisely about
managing tensions and the articulation of ‘precarious solutions.’”42
If the goal, however, becomes reaching consensus and causes the
suppression of dissent and confrontation, such an emphasis on the
“common good,” “common values” or collective unanimity can
lead to “apathy and disaffection with political engagement.”43
Without a true commitment to pluralism, certain groups will
disengage from political participation if they think such
participation will never yield results that they perceive as
important, or if they perceive an entire process as unduly
burdensome or even threatening to their group identity.44
Due to the antagonistic nature of pluralism and the temporary
nature of any type of consensus derived from public deliberations
and multiple forms of expression, pluralist democracy by its nature
is both dynamic and fragile.45 However, pluralist democracy
potentially engages the most stakeholders and diverse groups in
governance, thus enriching democratic discourse.46 Dissenting
views, besides creating antagonism and conflict, also challenge the
prevailing consensus.47 Divergent views “can be a powerful tool

40

Weinrib, supra note 11, at 175.

41

John A. Guidry & Mark Q. Sawyer, Contentious Pluralism: The Public Sphere and
Democracy, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 273, 277 (2003).

42

Mouffe, supra note 33, at 9.

43

Id. at 16.
Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1293.

44
45

Id. at 1294.

46

Id. at 1295.

47

N.V. Konovalenko, Democratic Framework of the Freedom of Speech: Possibilities and
Limitations, 1 PERSPECTIVES OF SCIENCE AND EDUCATION 28 (2014) (Russ.). See also
Alexandra V. Orlova, The Soft Power of Dissent: The Impact of Dissenting Opinions
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when it comes to debate and democracy, precisely due to their
capacity to show the availability of ‘multiple truths’ and keep the
conversation open.”48 In a pluralist democracy, the majority is
forced to bargain with minority interests.49 While marginalized
groups attempt to claim space in the public sphere, elite groups
frequently try to retain existing power dynamics and
relationships.50 This process of constant bargaining requires
continual conflict management.51 Despite this perpetual need to
account for conflict, “contentious pluralism,” is in part realized
through freedom of expression, and thought to be essential for
democracy.52 In order for democracy to develop and endure,
“contentious pluralism must continually subvert the relationships
of power that emerge in public spheres.”53
Many jurisdictions around the world have specifically written
the commitment to pluralism directly into their constitutions.54
Despite this seeming recognition of the importance of pluralism for
democracy, the very concepts of democracy and pluralism are
increasingly being challenged in many places around the world.55
In part, this challenge derives from the gap between “democracy’s
potential and its lived experience.”56 While elections are now
commonplace, the key features of democracy, such as equality,
freedom of speech, fairness and restraint are lacking in many
nations.57 This weakening commitment to democracy and
pluralism stems from many factors, such as the disastrous war in
Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis and a broader desire to regain control
from the Russian Constitutional Court, 52 VANDERBILT J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. 611
(2019), forthcoming.
48
Orlova, supra note 47, at 641.
49
50
51

Eskridge Jr., supra note 34, at 1295.
Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 273.
Eskridge Jr., supra note 34, at 1295.

52

Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 277. See also Anthony Downs, An Economic
Theory of Democracy, 65 J. OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 135 (1957); ROBERT DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1974).

53

Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 274.

54

Nemkevich, supra note 36, at 272.
John D. Whyte, Democracy in Decline: Steps in the Wrong Direction, 40 QUEEN’S
L. REV. 787, 787 (2015) (book review).
56
Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 274.
55

57

Whyte, supra note 55, at 787.
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due to the local impacts of globalization.58 As Anne Applebaum
says, “People very much have the sense . . . that their politicians no
longer control events. The ‘Leave’ campaign slogan in the Brexit
referendum campaign was ‘Take Back Control.’”59 Russia is
certainly not unique in its departure from democratic principles
and values in general and pluralism and freedom of speech in
particular. For example, on October 9, 2018, the Rossiiskaya Gazeta
newspaper, the official governmental mouthpiece and the most
widely circulated newspaper in Russia, published an article by V.
Zorkin, Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court. In the
article, Zorkin stated that the changes generated by globalization
are not always beneficial and at times carry enormous risks and
costs in various spheres of human life in many nations around the
world.60 Thus, a desire to oppose these processes of globalization
and resistance to universalization is felt in many jurisdictions.
Zorkin stated that:
[a]t the level of mass consciousness, this is
manifested in the desire to formulate their religious,
national, or regional (for example, European)
identity, to preserve and strengthen the traditional
values of the family, culture, life, etc. And at the
level of public authorities, this is manifested in the
desire to prevent the erosion of national state
sovereignty and to solidify national constitutional
identity.61
Zorkin further asserted that when it comes to public consensus
pertaining to the content of human rights, this consensus is
established by most of society and is established for the majority.
Zorkin stated that he does not mean to say that the concept of
constitutional identity is focused only on the protection of the rights
58

Matt Gurney: This May Be How the West Might Be Lost, NATIONAL POST (Mar.
29, 2019, https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matt-gurney-this-may-be-how-thewest-might-be-lost).

59

Id.

60

Valerii Zorkin, Bukva I duh Konstitutsii, [The Letter and the Spirit of the
Constitution], ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.], (Oct. 9, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://rg.ru/2018/10/09/zorkin-nedostatki-v-konstitucii-mozhno-ustranittochechnymi-izmeneniiami.html [https://perma.cc/6MAG-Q9J4] (Russ.).

61

Id.
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of the majority. However, he did state that the rights of minorities
could be protected only to the extent that the majority agrees.
Zorkin emphasized, “it is impossible to impose on society a
legislative norm that denies or calls into question the basic values
of the common good shared by the majority of the country’s
population.”62 It is clear that the solidification of Russian national
constitutional identity through the emphasis on majoritarian
consensus constitutes a clear challenge to the value of pluralism.
Pluralism is portrayed not as a stabilizing societal element that
creates greater governmental transparency and accountability as
well as greater access to the political process, but instead as
destabilizing and even threatening to national security.63 While the
commitment to pluralism and free speech have been specifically
written into Articles 13 and 29 of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation,64 the Russian state has a long history of suppressing
dissent and minority rights.65 The “aggressive minority” has been
blamed for trying to undermine Russia politically, economically
and socially.66 Thus, the current government perceives freedom
(including freedom of speech) as something that needs to be
carefully managed, because “if freedom is not ‘managed’ people
[meaning the majority] will suffer.”67 It is asserted that too much
information that is not properly controlled and managed by the
state can cause “system overdose” and eventual loss of confidence
in the system.68 Therefore, the government engaged in a deliberate
62

Id.
DAPHNE SKILLEN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN RUSSIA: POLITICS AND MEDIA FROM
GORBACHEV TO PUTIN 321 (Richard Sakwa et al. eds., 2016).
64
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF][Constitution] art. 13, 29
(Russ.)(Article 13 reads as (1) Ideological plurality is recognized in the Russian
Federation and (2) No ideology may be established as the state or obligatory
ideology. Article 29 reads as (1) Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of
thought and speech).
63

65

V.A. Kochev and A.B. Ektumaev, Pravo na svobodu slova kak osnovnoe pravo [The
Right to Freedom of Speech as a Fundamental Right], PERM U. HERALD JURID. SCI.
134 (2017) (Russ); Alikhan Beslanovich Ektumaev, Predely I Granitsy Prava na
Svobudu Slova [Metes and Bounds of the Freedom of Expression], Perm U. (2017)
(Russ).
66
SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 320
67
68

Id. at 322.

A.V. Rossoshanskiy, Infortatsionnyi Suverenitet I Svoboda Slova v Kontekste
Politicheskoi Modernizatsii v Sovremennoi Rossii [Information Sovereignty and
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effort to create so-called “information sovereignty”69 by
eliminating pluralism and dissenting viewpoints from the
mainstream.70 Loss of this “information sovereignty” is perceived
to be dangerous, and governmental control over most information
channels is equated with people’s trust in the ability of the
government to sort out what information is socially useful for the
Russian society.71 Thus, controlling information flows is perceived
as key to ensuring security and political sovereignty.72
Because of the deliberate attacks on alternative viewpoints,
especially after the 2011–12 public protests against the violation of
voting procedures during the Russian presidential election, dissent
has been practically removed from the political sphere.73 The Putin
regime viewed the election protests as an attempt by the West to
effect regime change in Russia, using political dissenters to achieve
this goal.74 Hence, in the aftermath of these protests the regime
undertook several measures to suppress political dissent. Examples
of suppression include the July 2012 federal law that forces
nongovernmental organizations that accept any sort of foreign
funding to register as “foreign agents” and to provide reports of
their activities every six months.75 In the same month, defamation
was reintroduced as an offence in the Russian Criminal Code,
making it easier to control the media through the charge of making
Freedom of Speech within the Context of Political Modernization in
Contemporary Russia], 1 Irkutsk St. U., 19, 22 (2012) (Russ.).
69
SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 333.
70
Id. at 326.
71

Rossoshanskii, supra note 68, at 23.

72

Id. at 326.

73

Pavel Romanov & Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, “Foreign Agents” in the Field of Social
Policy Research: The Demise of Civil Liberties and Academic Freedom in Contemporary
Russia, 25:4 J. OF EUR. SOC. POL’Y 361, 362 (2015).
74
See Ellen Barry, Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
10,
2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-inmoscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html).
75

О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской
Федерации в части регулирования деятельности некоммерческих
организаций, выполняющих функции иностранного агента [On
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the
Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Organizations Performing the
Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] July 20, 2012.
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defamatory public statements.76 In June 2012, harsher
administrative penalties were introduced for violations during
public rallies.77 Moreover, Russian law requires permission from
authorities for public gatherings involving more than one person
expressing an opinion.78 The government also passed federal
legislation aimed to suppress so-called “gay propaganda” directed
at children79 in an effort to promote “traditional values.” In June
2013, in response to the feminist punk group Pussy Riot’s
performance at Christ the Saviour Cathedral, section 148 (Violation
of the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion) of the Russian
Criminal Code was amended to criminalize “public action
expressing clear disrespect for society and committed in order to
insult the religious feelings of believers”80 and a punishment of up
to three years imprisonment was set if the offence was aggravated
by “its commission in places designed for religious services,
religious rites and ceremonies.”81 After the 2014 annexation of
Crimea and the resulting conflict with Ukraine, the Russian
political establishment perceived themselves to be engaged in an
“information war” with both Ukraine and the West.82 Hence, any

76

О внесении изменений в Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации и
отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации [On Amendments
to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ,]
July 28, 2012.
77
Alexandra V. Orlova, Challenging Everyday Violence of the State: Developing
Sustained Opposition Movements through Anti-Corruption Protests, RESEARCH IN
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE (181) (Patrick G. Coy eds. 2018).
78
Federal’nyi Zakon RF O Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Federal'nyy zakon “O
Sobraniyakh, Mitingakh, Demonstratsiyakh, Mitingakh i Piketakh” [On
Amendments to the Federal Law “On Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations,
Rallies and Pickets.”], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] June 8, 2012.
79
Federal’nyi Zakon RF V Tselyakh Zashchity Detey ot Informatsii,
Vystupayushchey za Otritsaniye Traditsionnykh Semeynykh Tsennostey [For the
Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of
Traditional Family Values], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] June 30, 2013.
80

Online and On All Fronts: Russia’s Assault on Freedom of Expression, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 18, 2017), https://www.hrpw.org/report/2017/07/18/online-andall-fronts/russias-assault-freedom-expression.

81

Gleb Bogush, Criminalisation of Free Speech in Russia, 69 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES
1242, 1246 (2017).

82

S.N. Ilchenko, Politicheskaya Iznanka Shou-Tsivilizatsii: Illuzii Svobody Slova I
Informatsonnaya Voina, [The Political Inside Out of Show of Civilization: Illusions

2019

PLURALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONFLICT WITHIN

15

viewpoints that were critical of the government’s Ukraine policy
were equated with the “systematic and mass [media] attack by the
enemy” and had to be dealt with.83 Clearly, the government felt an
urgent need to control freedom of expression, as it was viewed as
“fuel” for other acts designed to destabilize Russia.84
In addition to banishing pluralism from the political sphere,
the government also engaged in a concerted effort of connecting
human rights with morality, making rights unavailable to
“sinners”85 and thus neglecting the moral pluralism of human
rights.86 The government engaged in a deliberate campaign of
defining human rights in accordance with Russian “traditional
values” as a way to subordinate democracy and pluralism to
sovereignty87 and to portray criticism of the government as
unpatriotic, dangerous and designed to weaken Russia.88 Instead
of the content of human rights being determined in a pluralistic
manner, human rights became deliberately associated with certain
moral discourses.89 Hence, human rights are increasingly discussed
as subject to local norms, rather than as universal.90 Asserting the
“Russianness” of human rights became a way to resist Western
values and those who support them by defining them as “unof Freedom of Speech And Information War], KOMUNIKATIVNYE ISSLEDOVANIYA at
19. (Russ.) (2014).
83
Id. at 21.
84
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ROSSII at 72. (Russ.) (2016).
85
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(2017).
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Russian.”91 The emphasis on so-called “traditional values” was
explained by a need to maintain a firm connection to Russia’s
culture and history.92 Moreover, proponents of viewpoints that
oppose regime’s policies have been presented as extremists and
traitors and subjected to criminal and administrative law sanctions,
thus rendering many important political and social issues beyond
the scope of acceptable debate.93 Furthermore, in 2015 the Russian
Parliament passed legislation enabling the Russian Constitutional
Court to declare rulings of international human rights tribunals
(such as the European Court of Human Rights) to be “nonexecutable,” if such rulings were not reconcilable with the Russian
Constitution.94 The Russian Constitutional Court has so far
declared that two of the Strasbourg Court’s rulings could not be
executed.95 Thus, the judiciary has contributed to government
efforts to shrink the space for public debate and pluralism.96
Human rights, including freedom of expression, have become
“hostage” to the regime’s interests and limitations have been
increasingly justified by security and morality concerns.97
In his 2019 state of the union address to the Federal Assembly,
Putin reiterated Russia’s continued commitment to “traditional
values,” due to Russia’s identity being “rooted in centuries-long
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traditions and the culture of our people, our values and customs.”98
Putin also criticized Western (particularly US) “exceptionalism”
and “supremacy” and stated that Russia cannot survive as a state
without maintaining its sovereignty.99 However, the current
Russian regime arguably is itself pursuing a policy of
exceptionalism on numerous fronts. In this new Russian
exceptionalism, loyalty is conflated with patriotism, the contours of
human rights are determined domestically and dissent and
pluralism in political and legal thought is presented as “Western
colonialism”100 that needs to be defended against.101 This new
Russian identity is fiercely protected by the current regime by its
maintaining “information sovereignty”102 that rejects protest,
dissent and criticism. The regime portrays itself as a “champion of
genuine, traditional European values against their perceived
degeneracy in ‘Gayropa.’”103 In a sense, Western (particularly
European) “detraditionalization”104 and the secular tradition of
human rights is constantly juxtaposed against Russian “traditional
values,” steeped in moral and religious principles.
The Russian Constitutional Court has contributed to the
construction and maintenance of “information sovereignty” by
“hollowing out” various rights in upholding the constitutionality
of governmental provisions designed to stifle dissent.105 While
98
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constitutional rights can be limited in some cases, such limitations
must be necessary in a democratic society.106 In other words, rights
cannot be limited to such an extent that they would lose their
substance, becoming a mere formality and thus irrelevant.107 The
very concept of self-governance, guaranteed to Russian citizens by
Article 32108 of the Russian Constitution, is inextricably connected
to the freedom of expression and pluralism also constitutionally
guaranteed in Articles 13 and 29. Hence, the stifling of freedom of
expression and pluralism has a direct impact on the quality of
dialogue between the state and civil society, thus directly impacting
self-governance and democracy.109
However, as protest and dissent are suppressed in the political
sphere (with suppression sanctioned by the legal recognition of the
constitutionality of limitations), they spread into the artistic
community, which has “always played an oppositionist role in
Russian and Soviet society.”110 A certain “carnivalisation” of
protest is occurring as it becomes increasingly hard for people to
express dissent, forcing inventive forms of protest to emerge.111 The
“punk prayer” performance by the women of Pussy Riot in Christ
the federal “anti-gay” legislation); see also Judgment of 8 April, 2014 No.10-П/2014
on the case concerning the review of constitutionality of the provisions of Item 6
of Article 2 and Item 7 of Article 32 of the Federal Law “On Non- Commercial
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Support of Public Initiatives”, citizens L.G.Kuz’mina, S.M.Smirensky and
V.P.Yukechev, 2014, No. 10, Item П/2014 (upholding the constitutionality of the
federal Foreign Agents Law).
106
M.V. Solomina, Svoboda Slova Kak Pravovaya I Politicheskaya Kategoriya, [Freedom
of Speech as a Legal and Political Category] Vestnik Omskogo Universiteta (2008)
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the Saviour Cathedral was precisely the type of artistic protest that
attempts to inject a dose of dissent into the current Russian political
discourse and challenge the carefully constructed status quo.

POLITICAL SPEECH VS. RELIGIOUS SPEECH
A. Pussy Riot Trial Decision (2012)
On February 21, 2012, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria
Alekhina and Yekaterina Samutsevich entered Christ the Saviour
Cathedral in Moscow. They dumped their backpacks in a pile and
took off their coats to reveal short, brightly coloured dresses. They
proceeded to put balaclavas on their faces, walked to the iconostasis
and altar, plugged in an amplifier for an electric guitar and began
singing and dancing. During the court hearing there was
disagreement about the lyrics. The accused women claimed that
they said, “Holy Mother, drive out Putin” and “Holy Mother,
become a feminist.” The prosecution witnesses claimed that the
women cursed and insulted God and the Church.112 The three
women were charged with criminal hooliganism motivated by
religious hatred under s.213 of the Russian Criminal Code. On
August 17, 2012 they were convicted and each sentenced to two
years of imprisonment.113 During their trial, the women argued
that they were not motivated by religious hatred, but were instead
trying to mount a political protest in an artistic form.114 Their main
complaints included the suppression of dissent by the Russian
state, anti-gay propaganda laws and the inappropriate support of
the Church for Putin’s presidency.115 The trial judge, however,
refused to examine the political aspect of the case and instead
focused entirely on the blasphemous nature of the women’s
conduct.116 The judge stated:
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The position taken by the defendants that all actions
in the Cathedral were not motivated by hatred and
enmity towards Christian believers and the
Orthodoxy, but were performed for political
reasons, is untenable, due to the fact that, as
evidenced by the witnesses’ testimony, when
committing this hooliganism act, the defendants
made no political statements and did not mention
any names of politicians.117
It is clear that the trial court took an exceptionally narrow view
of what constitutes “political speech” by limiting it to specific
political statements and calling out names of specific politicians.118
The Court also did not specify what exact conduct of the women
amounted to religious hatred,119 but based its conclusions of the
religiously offensive and hateful nature of the women’s speech
entirely on witness testimony120 and the impact of the performance
on “the religious considerations of the general public.”121 In other
words, the court did not give serious consideration to the intent
behind Pussy Riot’s performance.122 In 2014, the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation123 proclaimed that § 213 of the
Russian Criminal Code was not vague and was thus
constitutional.124 Moreover, the Constitutional Court stated that
domestic courts, when applying s.213, need to take account of the
historical and cultural traditions of the Russian people as well as
117
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118
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current social behavior norms when determining whether
hooliganism motivated by religious hatred took place.125 Therefore,
the Constitutional Court reinforced the importance of “traditional
values” and majoritarian consensus being closely associated with
religion and morality.
Thus, focus on the religious aspects of Pussy Riot’s speech is
unsurprising. On the one hand, this focus was meant to dismiss the
women as immoral sinners subscribing to Western ideals of
feminism126 and thus not deserving of protection. On the other
hand, the choice to focus on the religious nature of their speech was
a deliberate attempt to take advantage of the larger margin of
appreciation set by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
in religious speech jurisprudence, given the high-profile nature of
the Pussy Riot case and the likely challenge in the Strasbourg Court.

B. ECtHR’s Political Speech Jurisprudence
Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) guarantees the right to freedom of expression.127 However,
this right is not unlimited; Article 10(2) allows national
governments to limit freedom of expression to achieve a number of
aims, such as national security, territorial integrity, public safety,
prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals and
so on. However, Article 10(2) prescribes a three-part test that must
be satisfied by any governmental restriction to be held valid by the
court. Restrictions or limits on freedom of expression must (1) be
prescribed by law; (2) pursue a legitimate aim from the list of aims
in Article 10(2); and (3) be necessary in a democratic society.128 One
of the key elements of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence over the years has
been “the emphasis on the freedom of public, and particularly,
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political debate.”129 The ECtHR stated that “[i]n a democratic
system the actions or omissions of the government must be subject
to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial
authorities but also of the press and public opinion.”130 The very
high level of protection around political speech clearly indicates
that the ECtHR has placed priority on transparency when it comes
to matters of public interest in a democratic society.131 In other
words, the reason political speech gets such strong constitutional
protection is because it is viewed as essential to democratic selfgovernance.132 The ECtHR indicated in several cases that in a
democratic society public authorities should expect to be under
constant scrutiny by their citizens.133 The Court attached particular
importance to pluralism, dissent and tolerance. The ECtHR
emphasized that:
Although individual interests can on occasion be
subordinated to those of a group, democracy does
not simply mean that the views of the majority
should always prevail: a balance must be achieved
that ensures the fair and proper treatment of
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant
position.134
The ECtHR interpreted what amounts to “political speech”
broadly.135 The Strasbourg Court placed “criticism of elected
officials,”136 public commentary on public authorities and
governance issues137 as well as statements on matters of public
129
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concern138 into the category of “political speech.” Overall, the
ECtHR engages in proportionality analysis to examine whether any
particular limitation is necessary in a democratic society,139 in
which the Court examines whether the nature and severity of the
limitation imposed on freedom of expression is proportional to the
purpose that the government is aiming to accomplish. In cases of
political speech, applying the proportionality test by the ECtHR has
dramatically reduced the member states’ margin of appreciation of
what can be considered an appropriate limitation on freedom of
expression.140

C. ECtHR Religious Speech Jurisprudence
While the ECtHR has left member states very little room to
maneuver in dealing with limitations on political speech, in
religious speech cases the Strasbourg Court’s rulings have given
member states a wider margin of appreciation. When it comes to
forms of expression critical of religion falling under Article 10 of the
ECHR, it seems that the ECtHR has treated journalistic or scholarly
criticisms more favorably than the creative or artistic types of
critiques.141 This disparity in treatment stems from the
“gratuitously offensive” test set by the ECtHR in the Otto-Preminger
Institut v. Austria.142 The ECtHR held that the Austrian authorities
were justified in seizing and forfeiting a religiously satirical film
that presented an unflattering depiction of the Christian God, Jesus
Christ, and the Virgin Mary as well as showing them colluding with
the Devil.143 The intervention by the Austrian authorities were “to
prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on their
religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner,” given
that Austria’s population is mostly Roman Catholic.144 In the
138
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subsequent cases of Wingrove145 and IA,146 the ECtHR followed the
“gratuitously offensive” test set out in Otto-Preminger Institut
pointing to the “voyeuristic”147 or “abusive”148 nature of the
suppressed materials, noting that the materials lacked permissible
“provocative opinion.”149 In the Wingrove decision, the ECtHR
relied on the lack of the European consensus when it comes to
blasphemy law. Hence, the Court concluded that there was no
sufficient uniformity in European practice to draw a conclusion
that the offence of blasphemy was not necessary in a democratic
society.150 In both cases, the materials in question were artistic in
nature–a video and a novel. In the Murphy v. Ireland151 decision, the
ECtHR clearly struggled to reconcile the idea of pluralism as an
essential element of democracy with keeping religious peace. The
case centered on a ban on all religious advertising contained in the
Irish Radio and Television Act of 1988.152 The ECtHR noted “that
the concepts of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness on
which any democratic society is based mean that Article 10 does
not, as such, envisage that an individual is to be protected from
exposure to a religious view simply because it is not his or her
own.”153 However, the Court noted that “a wider margin of
appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when
regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to
offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals
or, especially, religion.”154
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On the other hand, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 in
the Giniewski155 and Klein156 cases, both dealing with publication of
provocative newspaper articles. In Giniewski, the ECtHR had to deal
with the legality of the defamation proceedings brought against the
writer of a newspaper article that discussed the role of the Roman
Catholic doctrine of fulfilment and its contribution to anti-Semitism
and the Holocaust.157 The ECtHR concluded that Article 10 was
violated since the “applicant’s statements contribute to a recurrent
debate of ideas between historians, theologians and religious
authorities.”158 The Court concluded that the article contributed to
the issue of public interest in a democratic society and thus was not
“gratuitous or detached from the reality of contemporary
thought.”159 Similarly, in the Klein case the Court held that the
criminal conviction of a writer of an article that criticized the
Slovakian Archbishop for his role in undermining the separation of
Church and State160 constituted a violation of Article 10 of the
ECHR.161 The Court stated that the “applicant’s strongly worded
pejorative opinion related exclusively to the person of a high
representative of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Contrary to the
domestic court’s findings, the Court is not persuaded that by these
statements the applicant discredited and disparaged a sector of the
population on account of their Catholic faith.”162
Finally, in a recent decision of the ECtHR in ES v. Austria,163
the Court strongly reaffirmed the “gratuitously offensive” test for
religiously offensive speech set out in Otto-Preminger. The case
dealt with the challenge to a criminal conviction of an applicant
under Article 188 of the Austrian Criminal Code for the offence of
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disparaging religious doctrines.164 The applicant asserted that her
Article 10 ECHR right to freedom of expression was violated.165 The
applicant had given several publicly advertised seminars titled
“Basic Information on Islam” at the right-wing Freedom Party
Education Institute.166 In these seminars, she described the Prophet
Mohammad as having pedophilic tendencies due to his marriage
with Aisha when she was six years old.167 The ECtHR held that
applicant’s criminal conviction served the legitimate government
aim of protecting religious peace168 and reiterated that the exercise
of the freedom of expression carried with it certain duties and
responsibilities, “including a duty to avoid as far as possible an
expression that is, in regard to objects of veneration, gratuitously
offensive to others and profane.”169 The ECtHR concluded that
there existed a wide margin of appreciation in this case due to the
sensitivity of the statements made by the applicant.170 The Court
concluded that “the applicant’s statements had been capable of
arousing justified indignation” and that “they had not been made
in an objective manner aiming at contributing to a debate of public
interest.”171 Thus, the applicant’s criminal conviction did not
violate Article 10 of the ECHR.172 The Court then rejected the
applicant’s assertion that her attack on the Prophet Mohammad
had to be tolerated because it formed part of “a lively
discussion.”173
It is clear that the most recent decision of the ECtHR in the ES
v. Austria case reaffirmed the approach taken in the Otto-Preminger
Institut decision, reiterating the “gratuitously offensive” test for
limitations placed on religious speech. The approach to religious
speech taken by the ECtHR has been criticized on a number of
fronts. For instance, it was argued that the Otto-Preminger Institut
164
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case that set out the “gratuitously offensive” test was too focused
on “majoritarian sentiments in Austria,” emphasizing that
Austria’s population is primarily composed of Roman Catholics.174
However, some might argue that if the overwhelming majority of
the population are Roman Catholics, then a shocking religious
assertion is unlikely to seriously undermine individual religious
rights.175 Similarly, in I.A. v. Turkey, the ECtHR also considered the
demographic argument and that many active Muslim believers in
Turkey would be disturbed by provocative statements on Islam.176
Arguably, the ECtHR failed to identify any significant harm to
believers who were the dominant majority beyond the possibility
of offence flowing from the limited advertising and public
discussion of the provocative materials.177 Moreover, it has been
argued that the key problem with the “gratuitously offensive” test
is that international human rights law does not recognize the right
to have individual religious beliefs spared from criticism or even
ridicule or insult. In other words, there is no right in international
law “to have one’s religious feelings respected.”178 Thus, decisions
by the ECtHR regarding religiously offensive speech have faced
criticism for supposedly “introducing into the Convention a new
right not to be offended.”179 The standard for member states to be
able to limit rights—“serious offen[ce] [to] the deeply held feelings
of [believers]”—is very vague and prone to expansive
interpretation.180 A better approach to justify restricting freedom of
expression is to focus on verbal or written attacks on religious
groups that “reach the level of inciting hatred and violence.”181
Even this approach would require the state to demonstrate a
pressing social need to restrict such religious speech.182
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D. The ECtHR’s Pussy Riot Decision (2018)
Clearly, when it comes to resolving a conflict between freedom
of expression and freedom of religion, which have equal status in
the ECHR, the ECtHR favored “protecting religious sensibilities,
even in spite of the criticism of legal scholars and even the CoE’s
[Council of Europe] own advisory bodies,” particularly when
dealing with artistic or creative expression.183 Hence, in light of the
ECtHR’s differences in approach to political and religious speech,
the decision by the Russian trial court in the Pussy Riot case—to
frame the conduct of the accused as religiously offensive speech—
was clearly a strategic decision, especially given the ECtHR
“gratuitously offensive” test for offensive religious speech and
considerations of impact on the dominant religious majority. While
Article 14 of the Russian Constitution states that the “Russian
Federation shall be a secular state,” throughout Putin’s rule Russian
Orthodoxy has been synthesized with Russian national identity
through the emphasis on “traditional values.”184 Thus, the
reframing of the issues from political speech to religious speech
during the Pussy Riot trial was unsurprising, given the
government’s overall emphasis on “traditional values” and
Russian identity distinct from the West, as well as the ECtHR’s
inconsistent rulings regarding religious speech and a wider margin
of appreciation available to member states. It was clear from the
high-profile nature of the trial that the Pussy Riot case was headed
for the ECtHR. In turn, the ECtHR’s decision in the case hinged in
large part on the Court’s classification of whether Pussy Riot’s
speech was religious or political. If the speech were to be classified
as religious, then an argument could be mounted that the
restrictions and even criminal punishment of Pussy Riot’s conduct
was necessary in order to protect public safety by safeguarding “the
large community of Russian Orthodox believers from insulting
their feelings, and preventing incitement of religious hatred and
interpersonal conflicts on religious grounds.”185
At the ECtHR the applicants complained that the criminal
proceedings against them and their subsequent detention and
conviction for their “punk prayer” performance violated Article 10
183
184
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of the ECHR.186 The Russian government asserted that the
applicants’ conviction for hooliganism was not due to them
expressing their opinions, but rather because they had committed
an offence punishable by the Russian Criminal Code.187 If there had
been an interference with the applicants Article 10 rights, then such
an interference had been “in accordance with the law.”188 The
government claimed it had a legitimate aim in interfering with the
applicants’ rights as it “sought to protect Orthodox Christians’ right
to freedom of religion.”189 Furthermore, the interference was
proportional and necessary in a democratic society “in order to
safeguard the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention.”190
Not surprisingly, the Russian government went on to rely on the
Otto-Preminger Institut case to argue that the applicants had “an
obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are
gratuitously offensive to others and thus infringement of their
rights, and which therefore do not contribute to any form of public
debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs.”191
Therefore, the actions of the applicant in a place of religious
worship were targeting Christians who worked in or visited the
cathedral and “had undermined tolerance.”192 The government
asserted that the applicants were not being punished for their ideas
or opinions, but rather for the form in which they chose to impart
those opinions.193 The government stated that “the Court should
consider the context and not the content of their speech.”194 In the
government’s view, “the applicants’ conduct could not ‘contribute
to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in
human affairs’ and had merely been a provocative act and public
disturbance, which had constituted an unjustified encroachment on
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others’ freedom of religion.”195 While the Russian government’s
framing of the applicants’ actions as religious speech and its
reliance on the Otto-Preminger Institut’s “gratuitously offensive”
test is not surprising, the government’s insistence that only the
context, rather than the content, of the applicants’ speech should be
considered is clearly at odds with the Otto-Preminger Institut and
the more recent ES v. Austria line of cases, where content was
clearly highly relevant.
The applicants maintained that their Article 10 rights were
violated when they were prosecuted for their performance.196 The
applicants argued that Russian domestic courts failed either to
acknowledge their explicitly political message or to assess the
proportionality of their performance’s interference with freedom of
religion.197 The applicants argued that they chose the venue of their
performance for political reasons, since the Patriarch of the Russian
Orthodox Church had utilized the cathedral for a political
speech.198 The applicants further noted that their song criticized
public and religious officials for their exercise of their official
functions.199 The applicants argued that “political speech enjoyed
the highest level of protection under the Convention as being of
paramount importance in a democratic society.”200 The applicants’
submissions were clearly meant to frame this case in terms of
interference with political speech, which enjoys the highest level of
protection.
The ECtHR commenced its analysis of the case by
emphasizing that freedom of expression constitutes “one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society.”201 It is applicable not
only to favourable, inoffensive or neutral ideas and information,
but also to those ideas and information that “shock or disturb; such
are the demand of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness,
without which there is no ‘democratic society.’”202 Article 10
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protects both the substance, and, the form, in which the ideas and
information are conveyed.203 However, freedom of expression is
not an unlimited right and is subject to exceptions; but these must
be strictly construed.204 In order for governmental interference to
be justified under Article 10, it must be “prescribed by law,” pursue
a legitimate aim from the purposes listed in Article 10(2) and be
necessary in a democratic society, which requires a proportionality
analysis.205 The ECtHR further noted that in assessing the
proportionality of governmental interference with the freedom of
expression, the Court will consider “the nature and severity of the
penalty imposed.”206
The ECtHR described the applicants’ performance as a mix
of conduct and verbal expression that amounted to a form “of
artistic and political expression covered by Article 10.”207 It is clear
that from the very beginning the ECtHR framed this case as one of
political speech, deserving the highest level of protection, thus
reducing the Russian state’s margin of appreciation. The ECtHR
noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicants as well
as their subsequent prison sentence constituted an interference
with their right to freedom of expression.208 The Court chose not to
focus its analysis on whether the interference with the applicants’
freedom of expression was “prescribed by law,” instead choosing
to decide this case on the basis of the proportionality of the
interference.209 The ECtHR concluded that the interference with the
applicants’ freedom of expression was for the purpose of a
legitimate aim—“protecting the rights of others.”210 The ECtHR
then based its conclusions regarding the merits of this case by
examining whether the Russian government’s interference with the
applicants’ freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic
society. The Court indicated that when it comes to Article 10(2) of
the ECHR, there is “little scope…for restrictions on political speech
203
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or debates on questions of public interest.”211 Furthermore, giving
an artistic performance or political speech in a public place,
depending on the nature and purpose of the place, may require
respect for certain rules of conduct.212 Since the applicants’
performance took place in Moscow’s Christ the Saviour Cathedral,
it did violate certain accepted rules of conduct in a place of religious
worship; thus, imposition of certain sanctions could be justified.213
However, the ECtHR also noted that the applicants’ performance
did not disrupt religious services or cause injuries to people inside
the cathedral or damage to church property. Given these factors,
the ECtHR found that the penalty imposed on the applicants was
very severe in relation to their conduct.214 The ECtHR also noted
that Russian domestic courts failed to examine the content of the
applicants’ performance, but instead based their conviction of the
applicants almost entirely on their conduct.215
The ECtHR noted that the applicants were convicted of
hooliganism, motivated by religious hatred on account of the type
of clothing that they wore, their body movements, and their strong
language. Although the applicants’ conduct may have offended
people, including churchgoers, nothing in their conduct amounted
to incitement to religious hatred.216 The Russian domestic courts
failed to examine whether the applicants’ actions “could be
interpreted as a call for violence or as a justification of violence,
hatred or intolerance.”217 There was also no examination of
whether applicants’ actions could have led to harmful
consequences.218 The ECtHR concluded that the applicants’ actions
did not contain elements of violence and did not stir up or justify
violence, hatred or intolerance of believers.219 The ECtHR stated
that:
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[I]n principle, peaceful and non-violent forms of
expression should not be made a subject to the threat
of imposition of a custodian sentence, and that
interference with freedom of expression in the form
of criminal sanctions may have a chilling effect on
the exercise of the freedom, which is an element to
be taken into account when assessing the
proportionality of the interference in question.220
The ECtHR concluded that while certain governmental actions
towards the applicants may have been justified, the Russian
domestic courts failed to justify how the criminal conviction and
prison sentences imposed on the applicants were proportionate to
the government’s aim.221 Hence, the interference with the
applicants’ freedom of expression was not necessary in a
democratic society222 and constituted a violation of Article 10 of the
ECHR.223 It is clear that while the Russian domestic court framed
the Pussy Riot case as revolving around religious speech, the
ECtHR, very early on, stated that the case was clearly about
political speech and, therefore, the finding of a violation of Article
10 was almost to be expected.
Despite the differences in framing of the Pussy Riot case by
the Russian domestic courts and the ECtHR—as either religious or
political speech—the case points to a broader issue than the one of
politics vs. religion. Ultimately, Pussy Riot’s performance and
subsequent legal cases were about the ability of “contentious
pluralism”224 and dissent to counter the carefully constructed
government narrative of “traditional values” and moral
sovereignty.225 The reason why Pussy Riot’s members faced severe
criminal sanctions in the first place was not due to their offence of
religious feelings, but rather because they were trying to gain a
foothold in the Russian public sphere and were thus threatening
the Russian state’s carefully constructed “information
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sovereignty.” The women of Pussy Riot engaged in the act of
“contentious pluralism” and were punished in order to send a
chilling message to other dissenters.

CONCLUSION
Pluralism and the conflict that it brings are considered to be
threatening, as they put ideas into the public realm that compete
with the official narrative. These ideas and their manifestations
through human rights discourse are defined as threatening
“traditional values” and thus political, legal, and moral
sovereignty. Therefore, the Russian state’s current view is that
pluralism is something that needs to be managed in a democracy,
and democracy needs to be based on satisfying the interests of the
majority.226 Thus, minority rights are considered only to the extent
that they do not interfere with the majority.227 The Russian state has
deliberately engaged in the construction of the “aggressively
obedient majority”228—which is hostile to cultural pluralization
and angry about the economic, social and cultural impacts of
globalization229—through various forms of suppression of dissent.
The Pussy Riot cases are an example of suppression of creative
forms of dissent through redefining it as sinful, foreign and unRussian.
Russia is certainly not unique in its uneasy relationship with the
concept of pluralism, as even international institutions such as the
ECtHR struggle to accommodate the idea of pluralism with the
clash of rights that is frequently played out in the public realm. For
example, the ECtHR wants to advance religious pluralism on one
hand, while on the other hand some of its cases have trouble
dealing with pluralism’s contentious nature.230 Ultimately, what
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nations and institutions often fail to acknowledge is that the forces
that assail pluralistic democracy are not foreign, but rather
“internal to many, if not most, democratic nations…they are our
own ideas and voices.”231 In other words, the conflict is not so much
an external one, between a foreign and a domestic view of human
rights and dissent, but is rather internal, “between people who are
prepared to live with others who are different, on terms of equal
respect, and those who seek the protection of homogeneity.”232 The
protection of existing power structures and relationships,
reinforced by the reliance on “traditional values” steeped in
majoritarian consensus, is one of the key reasons why nations find
the idea of true pluralism to be so threatening.233 Contentious
pluralism continually aims to subvert power relationships and
structures that emerge in the public sphere.234 Challenging the
existing status quo is ultimately a call for transparency and
accountability. However, transparency, accountability and
examination of conflicts, injustices and inequalities in an open and
honest way is precisely what citizens need in order to truly “justify
a political structure . . . ‘for the right reasons,’ [rather than] because
they are afraid of chaos.”235 If true commitment to pluralism exists,
[t]he building of democracies, both existing and
future, will depend on how a contested pluralism
can construct new norms of recognition in which the
roles at work and at stake in political dramas
privilege a civil discourse that can take aim at the
structures of power – for power and inequality,
rather than conflict and contention, are the real
culprits working against democracy and a truly
“public’” sphere.236
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Hence, accountability is key when it comes to pluralism in the
public realm. This constant accountability is unimaginable without
freedom of expression and the voicing of dissenting opinions,
despite the ruling government’s attempts to consolidate its power
by silencing dissenters and couching its actions as protecting the
“traditional values” of the majority of the population. The role of
the judiciary then becomes key when it comes to protecting the
fundamental values that underlie a democratic society: “The
legislative and executive branches of government [should] not [be]
judges in their own self-interested cause. Rather, the judiciary is the
guardian of the constitutional order.”237 Unfortunately, Russian
courts, including the Russian Constitutional Court, have narrowed
the space for pluralism and accountability by supporting the
majoritarian conception of human rights espoused by the Russian
state and by actively penalizing dissenters, as was evidenced by the
Pussy Riot case.
In order to live up to its constitutional commitment to
pluralism, it is key for Russia to develop a safe space for public
discussion
pertaining
to
government,
governmental
representatives, and broader public policy issues. Such a culture of
discussion is currently missing.238 Furthermore, creative
communication cannot constitute an end in itself. Artistic forms of
protest need to appeal and be accessible to larger audiences.239
Thus, while Pussy Riot was widely supported outside of Russia, in
Russia itself even Russian feminists discussed the harmful nature
of their actions.240 Given the current widespread support for
Putin’s policies by the “aggressively obedient majority” and the
disconnect between Western and Russian conceptions of human
rights, rapid social change is unlikely when it comes to pluralism
and freedom of expression.241
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